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Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

upon ASARCO's equal protection rights nor provided special benefits
to GRIC.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's approval of the
GRIC settlement agreement.
James Henderson
COLORADO
City of Aurora v. ACJ P'ship, 209 P.3d 1076 (Colo. 2009) (holding that
the City of Aurora could not be granted conditional water storage rights
for its proposed reservoir site as the City could not satisfy the statutory
"can and will" requirement because of a pre-existing contractual
agreement between the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners
and Rangeview Metropolitan District).
The City of Aurora ("Aurora") filed an application for conditional
water storage rights for a proposed project that would divert water from
the Platte River into a new "East Reservoir." Aurora had not yet
determined where this reservoir would be located, so the application
contained requests for conditional water storage rights for six potential
sites. Three of the proposed sites are located on the former Lowry
Bombing Range ("Lowry Range"), which is administered by the
Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board"). Several
years prior, the Land Board and Rangeview Metropolitan District
("Rangeview") entered into a restated lease agreement that designated
four sites on the Lowry Range for use by Rangeview for future
reservoirs. As part of this lease agreement, Rangeview obtained nonexclusive rights-of-way for its reservoir sites. Three of Aurora's six
proposed sites significantly overlapped with the four Rangeview sites.
The Land Board rejected Aurora's request for access to the
disputed sites, noting that allowing this access would require Rangeview
to give up one or more of its sites and that the contractual arrangement
prohibited the Land Board from doing this without Rangeview's
consent In the subsequent action before the District Court, Water
Division 1 ("water court"), Rangeview requested a partial summary
judgment based on the assertion that Aurora could not satisfy the "can
and will" requirement for conditional water rights. To acquire a
conditional water right, an applicant must demonstrate that "there is a
substantial probability that the applicant can and will complete the
appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time." Because of
the lease agreement and the Land Board's rejection of Aurora's
request, the water court agreed with Rangeview that Aurora could not
satisfy this requirement, and subsequently granted the motion for a
partial summary judgment. Aurora appealed the partial summary
judgment and dismissal of its claim for conditional water storage rights
for the three disputed sites.
On appeal, Aurora maintained that the Land Board could have
granted access to the disputed sites without violating its contractual
arrangement with Rangeview for two reasons: (I) Rangeview's right-of-
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way in the contract was "non-exclusive"; and (2) the Land Board had
The court
the discretion to relocate Rangeview's rights-of-way.
the
court
contended
that an
with
both
arguments.
First,
disagreed
owner of property where another has rights-of-way may not interfere in
an unreasonable manner with those rights, and allowing Aurora access
to the disputed sites would unreasonably infringe on Rangeview's
rights. Second, the court noted that according to the terms of the lease
agreement, the Land Board could only relocate Rangeview's rights-ofway when it was convenient for both parties, not for the benefit of a
third party. Further, relocating rights-of-way was only permissible for
the "commercially reasonable development of the Lowry Range."
Aurora next argued that, in spite of the Land Board's rejection of
their request, the City could still potentially gain access to the disputed
sites through negotiation with Rangeview, and thus a summary
judgment based on the "can and will" requirement was not appropriate.
The court rejected this argument, noting that the fact that the parties
were opponents in this action was sufficient evidence that compromise
was not a substantial possibility.
Finally, Aurora contended that a less rigid "can and will" rule should
be applied in this case because speculation was not an issue. The court
responded by clarifying that this rule actually requires a technical
obstacle to the "can and will" requirement and that such a requirement
impedes maximum utilization. The court pointed out that neither of
these criteria was satisfied, and so the relaxed standard did not apply.
Similarly, the court noted that section 37-87-101 (1) (b) of the Colorado
Revised Statutes, which requires state agencies to allow persons to
acquire real property for water storage "to the maximum extent
practicable," does not apply in this situation as it would not be
"practicable" for the Land Board to acquiesce to Aurora's request for
access to the disputed sites.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court's ruling, and
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the decision.
JamesHenderson

N. Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Simpson, 202 P.3d 1207 (Colo. 2009)
(holding that a fixed water year does not itself impose a limit on
decreed storage rights, but is merely the administrative mechanism by
which the one-fill rule lawfully limits those rights).
The North Sterling Irrigation District ("NSID") requested water
under its storage rights; however, the State and Division Engineers for
Water Division No. 1 (the "Engineers") denied the requests. The
Engineers stated that the November 1 water year and the one-fill rule
limited NSID's diversions. NSID filed a Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment requesting that the water court determine whether Colorado
law authorizes the Engineers to impose a fixed water year on NSID for
purposes of administering the one-fill rule. The City of Boulder,

